Will I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca Affect the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal\u27s Review of Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Cases by Silver, Richard R.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1988
Will I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca Affect the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal's Review of Asylum and
Withholding of Deportation Cases
Richard R. Silver
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard R. Silver, Will I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca Affect the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's Review of Asylum and Withholding of
Deportation Cases, 10 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 197 (1988).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol10/iss1/6
Will INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca Affect the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's Review
of Asylum and Withholding of
Deportation Cases?
The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to itself a
power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to
dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promul-
gated standing laws, and known authorized judges. For the law of
nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the
minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite
or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake
where there is no established judge.I
John Locke
I. INTRODUCTION
Intent upon living an unshackled life, Europeans living under the
oppression of sixteenth and seventeenth century sovereigns migrated
to North America. Unrestricted immigration continued through the
late nineteenth century; and the early twentieth century brought new
waves of European immigration. This unique immigrant heritage
causes many Americans 2 to think of the United States as a haven for
refugees. While a popular sense of compassion for those fleeing perse-
cution is integral to the American self-image, United States refugee
law and policy in the latter half of the twentieth century has been
xenophobic and unpredictable. With this in mind, Congress passed
the Refugee Act of 1980.
3
This Comment will initially summarize United States post-
World War II refugee legislation in order to place the Refugee Act of
1980 in an historical context. The Refugee Act was an attempt by the
legislature to remedy the ad hoc nature of American refugee policy
1. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 112-13 (1968).
2. For purposes of this Comment, the words "America" and "American" refer to the
United States and all individuals within the United State's borders.
3. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.); ("[T]he Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United
States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands
.... ") 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1982).
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and codify the United States' historical commitment to aid refugees. 4
Congress sought to accomplish this by incorporating the United Na-
tions' definition of a refugee into the United States' statutory law.
This refugee definition was intended to provide the benchmark for
uniform refugee admittance.
5
The success and potential of the Refugee Act will then be ana-
lyzed in the context of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' post-1980
case law concerning political asylum and withholding of deportation.
This exposition and analysis will demonstrate the inconsistency
within the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Refugee Act with re-
gard to the requirements of the United Nations' refugee definition.
6
In reviewing this issue, it is important to ask what role should the
courts take to insure the success of the Refugee Act's implementa-
tion? Did the United States Supreme Court's recent pronouncement
on the Refugee Act of 1980, IN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,7 resolve or
perpetuate this inconsistency? These questions will be examined in
light of traditional administrative law notions of delegation.
II. UNITED STATES POST-WAR REFUGEE LEGISLATION
A. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
In 1948, Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act which was
the first post-war statutory attempt to provide specific relief to refu-
gees.8 The Displaced Persons Act 9 was a direct response to the refu-
gee problem created by World War II.10
To qualify under the 1948 Act as a "displaced person," a person
must have been from a prescribed geographic region and must not
have been resettled by January 1, 1948.11 The displaced person also
4. Id.; see also infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 47-66.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 67-160.
7. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
8. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (repealed 1952).
9. The Displaced Persons Act adopted the International Refugee Organization's (IRO)
definition of a displaced person. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62
Stat. 1009, 1009 (repealed 1952).
10. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(c)-(d), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009-10
(repealed 1952). For example, one category of displaced persons were people who fled Nazi
persecution in Germany or Austria and had not firmly resettled in either of those countries by
January 1, 1948. Id.
11. Id. Congress required displaced persons to satisfy regular immigration admissions
standards in order to exclude Communists and other political undesirables. SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
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had to give assurances to the Displaced Person Commission that, if
admitted, he or she would not become a public charge.'
2
The 1948 Act had a separate standard for those who were resid-
ing in the United States prior to April, 1948. This group could apply
to the United States Attorney General for adjustment of immigration
status. If the Attorney General approved adjustment of immigration
status, he was required to report to Congress "all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case" that led to this conclusion.1 3 Congress had to
first pass a concurrent resolution before the Attorney General could
adjust immigration status.' 4 The Attorney General was required to
deport displaced persons if Congress failed to pass such a resolution. I 5
This procedure allowed the Attorney General considerable latitude in
screening applicants while Congress acted in a semi-judicial capacity
by reviewing adjustment claims. 16
B. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was a response to refugee-escap-
ees. ' 7 This Act's distinction between refugees from Communist and
non-Communist regions evidenced the marriage between immigration
and cold war foreign policy.' 8 The 1953 Act created specific quotas
for refugee-escapees, and delineated specific regions from which they
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 28 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAMS].
12. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(c)(3), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009-10
(repealed 1952). This included not taking the jobs of Americans. Displaced persons were
additionally required to show the commission they would be able to receive safe and sanitary
housing without displacing others. Id.




16. There is no separation of powers problem with this arrangement because concurrent
resolutions only require bicameralism and not presentment to the Executive. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1474 (4th ed. 1968); cf I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (one house legislative veto held unconstitutional because both bicameralism and present-
ment were absent).
17. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (expired Dec. 31, 1956).
"'Refugee' means any person in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Commu-
nist-dominated, who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or military
operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto .... " Refugee Relief
Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 400, 400 (expired Dec. 31, 1956). "'Escapee'
means any refugee who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion, fled from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or other Com-
munist, Communist dominated or Communist-occupied area of Europe .... Id. § 2(b).
18. Id.
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could apply.19
The Refugee Relief Act was similar to the Displaced Person Act
in that both required the Attorney General to make an initial determi-
nation on adjustment of status by reporting pertinent facts to Con-
gress.20 Congress had to then grant permanent residence status by
concurrent resolution before the Attorney General was authorized to
adjust an alien's immigration status.
21
C. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act
The year before the Refugee Relief Act, Congress comprehen-
sively amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).22 The
19-52 Act contained two provisions that were to have a substantial
impact on refugees: section 243(h) (withholding of deportation) 23 and
section 212(d)(5) (parole).24  Withholding of deportation was both
strict and discretionary. In order to qualify under section 243(h), an
alien had to demonstrate that he or she had been subject to physical
19. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 4, 67 Stat. 400, 401 (expired Dec.
31, 1956). Unlike the Displaced Persons Act, refugee-escapees did not have their numerical
admissions allocations charged against general immigration quotas. Id. Those present in the
United States, who qualified under the statute's language, could apply for adjustment of immi-
gration status. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400, 403 (expired
Dec. 31, 1956).
20. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 4, 62 Stat. 1009, 1011 (repealed
1952); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400, 403 (expired Dec. 31,
1956).
21. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 4, 62 Stat. 1009, 1011 (repealed
1952); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400, 403 (expired Dec. 31,
1956). In 1957 Congress passed the Refugee-Escapee Act. Immigration and Nationality (Ref-
ugee-Escapee) Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957) (amending Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)). This Act was substantially
similar to the Refugee Relief Act in its definition of refugee-escapees and served the same
practical purpose. Id.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)).
23. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)). While all prior legislation was ad
hoc and of limited duration, one could argue that section 243(h) of the 1952 Act created the
first permanent base for refugee admissions. This argument is not strictly true because with-
holding deportation only allowed one to stay in the United States until conditions in the for-
eign country changed. The temporary nature of withholding deportation equally applies to
parole. Aliens admitted under either parole or withholding of deportation could potentially
adjust their immigration status. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§§ 212(d)(5), 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 188, 214 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(d)(5), 1253(h) (1982)).
24. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)).
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persecution.2 5 Despite a showing of physical persecution, however,
granting withholding of deportation was still in the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion. 26 An alien's right to remain in the United States
under withholding of deportation only lasted until the threat of physi-
cal persecution had subsided.
27
The Attorney General was also given discretion over the parole
standard, as well as implementation and possible revocation of pa-
role. 28 He was authorized to parole any alien into the United States in
emergencies or "for reasons strictly in the public interest."'2 9 Parole
was "designed to overcome ... the stringent entry requirements con-
tained in the INA without allowing the alien the legal protections
granted with formal entry into the United States."' 30  Parole was
viewed as a temporary measure. 31
Though initially designed for the benefit of individuals, parole
was used for mass admissions of Hungarians in 1956.32 This develop-
ment made Congress concerned about the "unfettered and un-
monitored use of parole for refugee admissions by the Executive. ' a33
Congress, nonetheless, continued to tolerate and, at times, endorse
this application of mass parole.3
4
As evidenced by contrasting the strict standard applied to Chi-
nese refugees with the liberal standard applied to Hungarians, the At-
25. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)). The subsequent 1965 amendment
changed the withholding of deportation provisions to read "persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion" instead of the physical persecution standard in the 1952 Act.
Immigration and Nationality (Refugee-Escapee) Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-235,
§ 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
26. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)) (The withholding of deportation is
now mandatory upon a showing of the requisite elements. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982)).
27. Id.
28. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)).
29. Id.
30. Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 15 (1981) [hereinafter Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis].
31. Refugee Resettlement Programs, supra note 11, at 29.
32. Id. at 30. See also id. at 10; S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
33. Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis, supra note 30, at 16 n.27.
34. Refugee (Fair Share) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The Fair Share Act was an official grant of parole
power to the Attorney General to parole refugee-escapees into the United States. Id. "The
Fair Share Law was criticized for its discrimination against certain groups of refugees and for
its failure to establish by permanent statute a refugee admission procedure." Anker & Posner,
The Forty Year Crisis, supra note 30, at 16.
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torney General used parole to advance United States foreign policy
objectives. 35 Reflecting on past uses of the parole authority, Attorney
General Griffin Bell commented:
I am not comfortable about the use of the parole authority in situa-
tions where I have exercised that authority in the past. Nor is this
discomfort unique to me. Every Attorney General before me...
has voiced similar reservations because the intent of Congress, in
establishing the parole authority, was to provide a safety valve for
unusual, individual cases of compelling need that could not other-
wise be met. It was not to provide the means to end-run the other
provisions of the immigration law.
36
The Ford administration and members of Congress found reli-
ance on parole an "[un]desirable means of formulating U.S. refugee
policy . . . and agreed not to authorize additional parole programs
until legislation establishing new, systematic refugee admission proce-
dures was enacted."
37
D. The 1965 Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act was again amended in
1965.38 The 1965 amendment created the first permanent statutory
basis for refugee admittance under section 203(a)(7) (conditional en-
tries). 39 Conditional entries could come from a wider geographic area
than in the 1948 and 1953 Acts.40 Section 203(a)(7), sometimes re-
ferred to as the "seventh preference," 41 was available to aliens apply-
35. Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis, supra note 30, at 20 n.49. The parole stan-
dard was completely amorphous: the Attorney General was given discretion to model a subjec-
tively appropriate standard for each situation where parole authority was exercised. Id.
36. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 9 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 11.
38. Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911,
912-13 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)). This section was limited to the
Eastern Hemisphere which severely restricted its application beyond Communist dominated
Eastern European regions. Id.
40. Conditional entrants under section 203(a)(7) could also come from the Middle East.
The Middle East was considered to be boarded by Pakistan on the east, Libya on the west,
Turkey on the north and Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the south. Id.; cf. supra notes 10 and
17.
41. Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911,
912-13 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)). Section 203(a)(7) was termed
the "seventh preference" because section 203(a) had nine categories, each ranked in a hierar-
chy of immigration preferences. Id.
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ing from Communist or Communist-dominated countries if an
Immigration and Naturalization Service officer determined that:
[(i)] because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Com-
munist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any
country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are
unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of
race, religion, or political opinion .... 42
The seventh preference was modified in 1976 to include the
Western Hemisphere. 43 This broad-sounding expansion was of little
practical importance because Cubans were the only group permitted
entry under the terms of section 203(a)(7). A problem arose due to an
insufficient number of visas for Eastern Hemisphere applicants.
Meanwhile the visas allocated to the Western Hemisphere went
largely unused because few applicants from nations of the Western
Hemisphere Countries could meet the definition of "refugee" in sec-
tion 203(a)(7). 44 In 1978, the Western and Eastern Hemisphere quo-
tas were merged, creating one international ceiling of 17,400.45 Even
after the East-West wall in 203(a)(7) collapsed, the admissions criteria
remained unchanged.
46
E. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the Refugee Act of 1980
In 1968, the United States ratified the 1967 United Nations Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol). 47 The Protocol
42. Id. In both the 1948 and 1953 Acts, and under section 203, the Attorney General
was required to report to Congress complete and detailed facts of each Refugee admittance
case granted. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 4, 62 Stat. 1009, 1011
(repealed 1952); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400, 403 (ex-
pired Dec. 31, 1956); Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3,
79 Stat. 911, 912, 914 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982). Unlike the
former acts, however, if the Attorney General did not terminate the conditional entry status
within two years, the alien was returned to I.N.S. custody for reevaluation. Id. If a special
inquiry officer found the alien admissible after reevaluation, the alien could then adjust her
immigration status to that of permanent residence. Id.
43. Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 4, 90 Stat.
2703, 2705 (1976) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)).
44. 124 CONG. REC. 21,426 (1978) (statement of Mr. Fish).
45. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 6.
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. This still had the practical effect of com-
pletely limiting section 203(a)(7)'s application to the Communist region of the Western Hemi-
sphere (Cuba).
47. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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incorporated the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. 48 The United Nations' definition of a refugee49
and non-refoulement 50 provisions were incorporated into the Proto-
col. Congress thought it would be possible to comply with the terms
of the Protocol without amending the Immigration and Nationality
Act.5' However section 203(a)(7) proved to be an inadequate vehicle
for the implementation of the United Nations standards. 52 This inad-
equacy was "demonstrated by .. .continued reliance on the parole
provision to assist refugees ineligible for conditional entry."'5 3
Senator Edward Kennedy, in a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance and others, noted the "urgent need... to establish a long range
refugee policy [that would] treat all refugees fairly and assist all refu-
gees equally."' 54 This letter was one of the catalysts for legislative
change that finally resulted in the Refugee Act of 1980.55
The Senate report accompanying the Senate refugee bill stated
the bill's objective of repealing the immigration laws' "discriminatory
treatment of refugees."'5 6 The bill eliminated section 203(a)(7) and its
48. Id.; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
49. The United Nations Convention defines a refugee as:
[any person who,] owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events is unable or ... unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. l(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6259,
6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 39, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152. For the United Nations construction of
the refugee definition see OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFU-
GEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS,
para. 80-83, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.II.1 (1979) [hereinafter U.N. HAND-
BOOK](selected portions provided in attached appendix).
50. The United Nation's nonrefoulement provision provides: "[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 54, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 176.
51. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 7.
52. Id.
53. Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion, Refugees, and International Law of the Commitee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1979) (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
54. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 15.
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geographical and ideological restrictions57 adopted the non-discrimi-
natory United Nations definition of "refugee" and raised annual regu-
lar refugee admittance from 17,400 to 50,000.
58
The Senate bill would have required the Attorney General to
promulgate a uniform asylum application procedure59 with the pro-
viso that "[a]sylum shall be granted if the alien is a refugee" within
the United Nations definition and "his deportation or return is pro-
hibited under section 243(h)." 6 Congress took these measures in or-
der to bring United States law into conformity with the United
Nations Protocol and Convention by providing a uniform asylum
procedure.
6'
Twelve years after the ratification of the United Nations Proto-
col, the Refugee Act of 1980 established the first separate asylum pro-
vision. The asylum provision was based on the United Nations
definition of a refugee. 62 Unlike the Senate bill, the Refugee Act's
asylum provision reads, "the alien may be granted asylum in the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General" if he finds the alien is a refugee
within the United Nations definition. 63 Withholding of deportation
became mandatory in the 1980 Act. 64 Mandatory non-refoulement
was consistent with prior bills65 and the United Nations Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees. 66
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' REVIEW OF
WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION AND ASYLUM CASES
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' review of the Board of Im-
migration Appeals' (BIA) withholding of deportation (withholding)
and asylum cases is at times intrusive and at times deferential. Two
57. Id. at 1-2.
58. Id. at 1, 15.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 19, 20 (1980).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). The Attorney General could adjust the status of up to
5,000 of all refugees admitted under section 207(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982). See appendix
for the United Nations construction of the "refugee" definition.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1243(h)(1) (1982).
65. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1980); see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Refugee Act also shortened the period
to adjust immigration status from two years to one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2) (1982).
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cases, Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N S.67 and Diaz-Escobar v. LNS. ,68 and
their progeny, are representative of this dichotomy. For analytical
clarity, the different Ninth Circuit standards of review will be labelled
"lines of authority." The first line of authority, as represented by Bo-
lanos-Hernandez and its progeny, looks directly to the Refugee Act
and the United Nations Protocol to review the BIA's withholding and
asylum standards.69 The second line of authority, represented by
Diaz-Escobar and its progeny, gives great deference to the BIA's ap-
plications of the Refugee Act's standards. 70
The following exposition will illustrate the relationship between
cases involving withholding of deportation and asylum and indicate
how different levels of judicial review affect this relationship. The Bo-
lanos-Hernandez line of authority tends to first analyze withholding
of deportation. It then concludes that if the standard for withholding
is satisfied, then a fortiori, the asylum standard has also been satis-
fied. 71 In contrast, the Diaz-Escobar line of authority tends to first
analyze asylum by stating the same proposition in the negative: if peti-
tioner has not satisfied their asylum burden, then a fortiori, petitioner
has not satisfied their withholding of deportation burden.72 Conse-
quently, the first line's withholding of deportation standard is dis-
cussed prior to the more deferential second line of authority's asylum
analysis.
In order to subsequently evaluate the impact of the United States
Supreme Court's LN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca decision upon the Ninth
Circuit's Refugee Act construction, the following discussion repre-
sents the Ninth Circuit state of the law in the window of time between
the Supreme Court's first Refugee Act decision, LN.S. v. Stevic,73 and
.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca.74 The Cardoza-Fonseca decision will then
67. Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
69. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277; see also Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d
1448 (9th Cir. 1985); Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
70. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d 1488; see also Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1986).
71. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277; Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448; Hernandez-Or-
tiz, 777 F.2d 509.
72. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d 1488; Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d 441. Because the Bolanos-Her-
nandez line of cases primarily analyzes withholding of deportation while the Diaz-Escobar line
is primarily concerned with asylum, it may seem like the following analysis compares apples
and oranges. Actually, the distinction between the asylum and withholding of deportation
standards is so tenuous that it is difficult to understand one without reference to the other.
73. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
74. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
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be discussed in the context of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
Refugee Act to determine what impact the decision will have upon
the previously existing state of asylum and withholding of deportation
cases in the Ninth Circuit.
A. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Construction of the Refugee
Act of 1980
1. First Line of Authority-Bolanos-Hernandez and Its Progeny
a. Withholding of Deportation
The Refugee Act's provision governing withholding of deporta-
tion provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any
aliens ... to a country, if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such a country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion."' 75 To obtain withholding of deportation it
is necessary to satisfy four requirements:
1. A likelihood of persecution; i.e., a threat to life or
freedom.
2. Persecution by the government or by a group which the
government is unable to control.
3. Persecution resulting from petitioner's political beliefs.
4. The petitioner is not a danger or security risk to the
United States.
' 76
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). All requests for asylum are also considered to be requests
for withholding of deportation under Immigration and Nationality Act section 243(h). 8
C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1987). When a claimant submits Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form 1-589 to apply for asylum, the district director is required to request an advisory opinion
on the claim from the State Department. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1987).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Chatila v. I.N.S., 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.
1985), that the adverse advisory opinion is clearly persuasive. Id. at 790. While the BIA
disregarded the affirmative State Department advisory letter for Zavala-Bonillo, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found it to be significant. Zavala-Bonillo v. I.N.S., 730 F.2d 562, 567 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984).
In the above two cases the court suggested that advisory letters are persuasive authority
whose weight is contingent upon the credibility of the witness and evidence. An alien has the
opportunity to rebut an advisory letter by presenting evidence to the contrary. An Immigra-
tion Judge, on the other hand, can only rebut an affirmative State Department finding by
impeaching the alien's credibility.
It is interesting to note that these form letters, even when requested to comment on sec-
tion 243(h), only address the discretionary "well-founded fear" standard. See Preston, Asylum
Adjudication: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugee's Rights and U.S. Inter-
national Obligations?, 45 MD. L. REV. 91 (1986).
76. Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Zepeda-
Melendez v. I.N.S., 741 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312,
1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
207
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[V
The term "likelihood of persecution," for purposes of withhold-
ing, means that it is "more likely than not" that persecution will oc-
cur,77 i.e., a greater than fifty percent chance of persecution.7 8  To
establish that persecution is more likely to occur than not, evidence of
general violence in a country is insufficient.7 9 The alien, or others
"similarly situated," must be "at a greater risk than the general popu-
lation."'80  Additionally, the threat must be serious.s1 Because
"[a]uthentic refugees rarely are able to offer direct corroboration of
specific threats," the court eliminated the requirement for corrobora-
tive evidence in establishing serious threats. 82 Testimony, if credible,
persuasive, and specific, will satisfy the serious threat requirement.8 3
Both withholding of deportation and political asylum requires a
showing that persecution is on account of political opinion.84 For
persecution to be on account of political opinion, it is not necessary
for the refugee to take sides in a conflict.85 To require such political
affiliation would frustrate the Refugee Act's objective of providing
"protection to all victims of persecution regardless of ideology. '8 6
Neutrality itself is considered a political opinion.8 7 If a persecutor
believes that his victim maintains a particular political opinion, and
persecutes on that account, the opinion is effectively imputed to the
victim: 8 8 "it is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses any of
these opinions. '8 9 This is known as imputed political opinion.
77. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 (1984).
78. Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985).
79. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1284; accord Zepeda-Melendez, 741 F.2d at 290;
Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452.
80. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d
1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984)).
81. Id. (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984)).
82. Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984).
83. Id. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985). Such uncor-
roborated testimony, according to the first line of authority, will also apply to the well-founded
fear standard. Id.
84. In addition to political opinion, asylum is available to people who have a "well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, [and] membership in a
particular social group .... " 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
85. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286; Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 517
(9th Cir. 1985); cf. Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441, 447 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286.
87. Id. at 1287.
88. Id. at 1286; Argueta v. I.N.S., 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusal to join one
side in a dispute constitutes a political opinion); Del Valle v. I.N.S., 730 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir.
1985).
89. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 517 (courts may examine the persecutor's motivation
for acting to evaluate whether persecution was on account of political opinion).
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Petitioner in Bolanos-Hernandez testified that his brother was
forced to fight with guerilla troops and that several of his friends were
killed after refusing requests to join guerrilla forces. 90 The court, in
addition to petitioner's testimony, considered as evidence newspaper
articles concerning general violence in El Salvador, and violent retri-
bution for both refusing to join guerrilla groups and airing political
views. 9' Bolanos-Hernandez, by refusing to join the guerrillas, had a
likelihood that he would be persecuted on the basis of his political
opinion by a group the government was unable to control. Therefore,
he was entitled to withholding of deportation. 92
In A rgueta v. I. N. S. ,93 Argueta testified that he was threatened by
"death squad" members who believed he belonged to a political
group. 94 He believed that the same men who threatened him had tor-
tured and killed his brother-in-law. 95 This testimony sufficiently es-
tablished imputed political opinion.96 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the BIA denial of withholding of deportation and
asylum, holding that, if Argueta's testimony was credible, he was enti-
tled to relief.
97
Petitioner in Aviles-Torres v. LN.S.98 sought review of the BIA's
denial of his request to reopen his withholding of deportation and asy-
lum case. 99 Aviles-Torres submitted new evidence which included a
Salvadoran newspaper article which described him as a guerrilla and
documentary reports by human rights groups on males who refused
military service in El Salvador."0° The court found that the article,
combined with refusing military service, made Aviles-Torres a "prime
target" for persecution and warranted "a hearing if not an outright
grant of relief."101
In the above three cases, the court did not require extensive evi-
dence corroborating the allegations of persecution. Petitioner's own
testimony formed the primary evidentiary basis in both Bolanos-Her-
90. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286.
91. Id. at 1280.
92. Id. at 1287-88.
93. Argueta v. I.N.S., 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1396.
96. Id. at 1397; cf. Zayas-Marini v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1397.
98. Aviles-Torres v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1434-35.
101. Id. at 1436.
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nandez and Argueta. Their testimony contained allegations of threats
by parties which had the ability to carry out their threats. By con-
trast, this evidence would probably have been insufficient for the sec-
ond line of authority to find that the petitioners had satisfied even the
less stringent asylum standard.
b. Asylum
An alien can obtain asylum in the United States if the Attorney
General, in his discretion, determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of the Refugee Act. 102 The Refugee Act defines a
refugee as: "any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality.., and is unable or unwilling to return to... that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."
10 3
While withholding is mandatory, granting asylum is discretion-
ary. "Persecution" must be based upon a "well founded fear," which
is defined as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
(in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regard[ed] as offen-
sive." 0 4 The "well-founded fear" standard has both an objective and
subjective component. The objective component requires credible, di-
rect, and specific evidence to support a finding that the fear is reason-
able. 10 5 The subjective component requires that the fear be genuinely
held. 0 6 Unlike withholding of deportation, asylum claims can have a
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (1982). This commonly is referred to as the "well-founded
fear" standard.
104. Kovac v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); accord Cardoza-Fonseca v.
I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1283
n.13 (9th Cir. 1984); Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (" 'Persecu-
tion' occurs only when there is a difference between the persecutor's views or status and that of
the victim .. "). While no bright line exists to determine the degree of persecution required
for a grant of relief, there does not seem to be a single case that distinguishes between the term
persecution as applied to asylum as opposed to withholding of deportation. See Comment,
The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in the United States Refugee Law, 39
STAN. L. REV. 187 (1986); see also infra note 182.
105. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986). In Cardoza-Fonseca, the
Ninth Circuit was guided by the Seventh Circuit standard for well-founded fear. 767 F.2d at
1453 (citing Carvajal-Munoz v. I.N.S., 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)).
106. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1283. " '[A] desire' to avoid a situation entailing the
risk of persecution 'may be enough' to satisfy the well-founded fear test." Id. at n. 11 (quoting
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 49)
(selected portions reprinted in the appendix); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452; Diaz-
Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d at 1492; Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1986).
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less than fifty percent likelihood of persecution to be successful. 0 7
In LNS. v. Stevic, the United States Supreme Court, in dicta,
stated that the standard for granting asylum is "more generous" than
the standard for withholding of deportation. 108 The Court further dif-
ferentiated the two standards by noting that the term "refugee" was
absent from the language of the withholding provision. 09 This is sig-
nificant because, by definition, to be within the Refugee Act's asylum
provision one must be a "refugee." 110 Judge Reinhardt, in Bolanos-
Hernandez, found this interpretation to be consistent with Congres-
sional intent.I1 Withholding of deportation is more difficult to obtain
because relief is mandatory upon an objective showing that the alien
would be persecuted. 1 12 Because withholding of deportation has more
stringent requirements than asylum, if the withholding burden is sat-
isfied, then the alien, a fortiori, qualifies for asylum.1 13
In £N.S. v. Stevic the Supreme Court, while specifically reserving
further consideration of the asylum issue, stated that whether the ap-
plicant "would be persecuted" is the standard for withholding of de-
portation.1 4 After the Stevic decision the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) applied a "would be persecuted" withholding of de-
portation standard to Arguella-Salguera's asylum claim. 1 5 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed and remanded
the case because the BIA admitted to applying one standard to both
claims. 116
Subsequent to the LN.S. v. Stevic decision, the BIA has applied
the "would be" standard to other asylum claims while asserting that
two standards have been applied. 1 7 This is significant because the
107. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452-53.
108. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984).
109. 1d. at 424.
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982); see also 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
111. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1283.
112. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422.
113. Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Del Valle
v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); Canjura-Flores v. I.N.S., 784 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.
1985); Damaize-Job v. I.N.S., 787 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S.,
782 F.2d 1489, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986); Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1986).
Once it is established that an alien qualifies for asylum it is still within the Attorney General's
discretion to grant or deny asylum. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1208 (1987).
114. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984).
115. Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985). Arguella-Salguera's
claim was consolidated with Cardoza-Fonseca's in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1450.
116. Id. Both the Immigration Judge and the BIA held that the withholding and asylum
standards were the same. Id.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 148-58.
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Supreme Court in Stevic stated, in dicta, that the asylum standard is
more generous than the withholding of deportation standard.
2. The Second Line of Authority-Asylum under Diaz-Escobar
Petitioner in Diaz-Escobar v. INS. was a Guatemalan who left
his country after he received a letter threatening that he would " 'be
subject to the consequences' " if he remained in the country."18 He
was unable to produce the letter, and had no idea from whom it came,
but maintained that he feared retribution due to his political neutral-
ity. Petitioner's testimony concerning the letter was considered credi-
ble and was unrefuted by the Immigration Judge and the BIA. 119 The
Ninth Circuit additionally found that the conditions in Guatemala
indirectly corroborated the letter's existence, that the "magnitude" of
the threat was serious and that there was a likelihood that the sender
"might" act upon their threat. 20 Because the origin of the letter was
unknown, the BIA found that petitioner's fear was not well-
founded. 121
The court agreed with the BIA that "Diaz-Escobar's evidence
[did] not establish a reasonable expectation of persecution."' 22 The
court declined to either grant withholding of deportation or to re-
mand the case for discretionary review of the asylum claim. While
the court expressed doubt as to whether the threat was politically mo-
tivated, it did not reach this issue because the court found the evi-
dence insufficient to establish the objective fear component of the
well-founded fear standard.1 23
Diaz-Escobar cut-back on the scope of evidence as testimony es-
tablished in Bolanos-Hernandez and its progeny. In Diaz-Escobar, the
court stated that while credible, unrefuted and indirectly corrobo-
rated testimony deserved serious consideration, 124 to permit such tes-
timony to satisfy an alien's burden of proof would approximate de
118. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d at 1489, 1490 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing I.N.S. v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 424 n.19 (1984)). In Stevic the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that
asylum is "more generous" than the withholding standard. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425. The Stevic
Court did not futher refine the relationship between the two standards.
119. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1493.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1490.
122. Id. at 1493.
123. Id. at 1494.
124. Id. at 1492.
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novo review. 125 This directly conflicts with Bolanos-Hernandez where
the court reasoned that "[i]f the alien's own testimony about a threat,
when unrefuted and credible, were [sic] insufficient to establish the
fact that the threat was made, it would be close to impossible for [any
political refugee] to make out a section 243(h) case.' 126 Acknowl-
edging that simply establishing that an alien was threatened does not
satisfy their statutory burden, the court in Bolanos-Hernandez rea-
soned that such establishment may hinge on whether the threat was
serious and issued from a party which had the capacity to carry it
out. 127
Credibility was not a disputed matter in Diaz-Escobar. The court
nonetheless hesitated to permit testimony alone to satisfy the thresh-
old burden of establishing an objective fear of persecution. The court
found that both the magnitude of the threat was serious and that the
potential threat could be carried out was indirectly corroborated by
the conditions in Guatemala. 128 These findings do not focus on the
subjective mind of the petitioner, but rather on the objective circum-
stances that created Diaz-Escobar's fear of persecution. If petitioner
had an objective fear, which the court's findings suggest, it then be-
comes necessary to analyze whether petitioner's fear was on account
of one of the five statutory grounds. 129
The court's reasoning analytically departed from the Bolanos-
Hernandez progeny at this point. Diaz-Escobar maintained that
while he did not know who had sent him the threatening letter, he
believed that he would be persecuted on the basis of his political neu-
trality. The Diaz-Escobar court stated that a politically neutral alien
must prove that the threat of persecution exists on account of his or
her political neutrality. 30 This holding negates the doctrine of im-
125. Id. The court suggests that it would be unreasonable to require the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to rebut an alien's testimony. Id.
126. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting McMullen v.
I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 49, para. 196,
at 47 (1979)). The court further noted that "[p]ersecutors are hardly likely to provide their
victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution." Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at
1285.
127. Id.
128. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. The five statutory catagories of persecution which qualify an alien as a refugee are
"persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
130. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1493-94; cf. Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 517
(9th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as
long as the [persecutor] believes that he does.").
213
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puted political opinion established in Bolanos-Hernandez.13  The
court in Hernandez-Ortiz v. 1N.S. reasoned that "it is irrelevant
whether a victim actually possesses any of [the opinions for which
they are persecuted] as long as the [persecutor] believes he does." 13
2
The Bolanos-Hernandez line of cases focuses on the subjective belief of
the persecutor and not on the actual belief of the victim.1
33
If petitioner's unrefuted testimony is sufficient to establish a seri-
ous objective threat under Bolanos-Hernandez then Diaz-Escobar's
showing, in light of the corroborating conditions in Guatemala,
should have been sufficient to establish this threshold burden. The
court next should have inquired into the statutory grounds for relief.
It is perhaps here that Diaz-Escobar would have been unable to ob-
tain relief because he did not know the origin of the letter. While the
petitioner could not demonstrate that the letter was from a party who
wished him harm because of any political opinion, the court incor-
rectly reasoned that if they were to reach the political opinion ques-
tion, the relevant inquiry would focus on petitioner's political
neutrality and not on the political opinion that may have been im-
puted to the petitioner.
In addition to interpreting the requirements for establishing
political opinion differently than the first line of authority, the Diaz-
Escobar court and its progeny heightened the alien's evidentiary bur-
den. The Diaz-Escobar court cited I.N.S. v. Stevic for the proposition
that to justify asylum a "showing may be slightly less than a clear
probability standard."'134 By July of 1986, the "may be" language of
Diaz-Escobar had become mandatory. The court in Rebollo-Jovel v.
.N.S. ,'135 stated that the asylum "standard requires slightly less than a
131. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286-87.
132. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 517 (citing Argueta v. I.N.S., 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1985); U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 49, para. 80-83, at 7).
133. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516. The court's reasoning in Diaz-Escobar implies that
an alien may only be considered a refugee if he or she was persecuted for his or her actual, not
imputed, beliefs. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986). This would
exclude all others who are the victim of persecution as a result of an imputed political opinion.
For example, if an alien had an outspoken record as an individual rights advocate, and
was persecuted by the government because the alien was believed to be a communist, a court
could use the Diaz-Escobar dicta to deny asylum. Asylum would then be denied because perse-
cution was not on account of individual rights activity. If the alien was persecuted for being a
member of a political group to which he or she was not a member relief could then be denied
because the alien's own beliefs were not the basis of the persecution.
134. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1492 (citing I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984))
(emphasis added).
135. Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1986).
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showing that persecution is 'more likely than not' ..... " to occur. 136
This shift in language effectively raised the alien's burden of proof for
asylum to a level commensurate with withholding of deportation.
In Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., the court found that unless the BIA's
language clearly means something other than what it purports to be,
the BIA decision should be affirmed. 137 Another part of the majority
opinion, however, acknowledges that the BIA does not regard the
asylum and withholding standards "to be meaningfully different." 38
Rebollo-Jovel left El Salvador after he received a threatening tel-
ephone call and two threatening letters. His uncle, the former Minis-
ter of Education of El Salvador, was murdered by extremists in 1979.
Two of his cousins had also recently been killed. He was interrogated
by three individuals disguised as policemen who "told him 'not to get
involved' in matters that were none of his business.' 39 The letters
and telephone call contained substantially the same waming.140 Be-
cause Rebollo-Jovel did not establish that the threats were from a
political group or on account of his political neutrality, the court did
not find them politically motivated. ' 4' The BIA's decision was, there-
fore, affirmed. 1
42
Judge Canby, writing separately in Rebollo-Jovel, concurred on
the withholding of deportation issue but dissented on the asylum
claim. ' 43 The dissent points out that the BIA had recently concluded
that "the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation are not
meaningfully different and, in practical application, converge.'" 144 If
the BIA is obliged to apply two standards and yet concedes that the
standards in practice converge, then the court "gives presumptive ef-
fect" 45 to the Board's invocation of "magic words"' 46 by affirming
the Board's purported application of two standards. Because
Rebollo-Jovel had a colorable asylum claim, the dissent would have
required the BIA to analyze his claim under the more lenient asylum
136. Id. at 443 (emphasis added) (citing Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1489, 1492 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
137. Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d at 447.
138. Id. at 444 (quoting Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985)).
139. Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d at 447.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 448.
142. Id.
143. Id. (Canby, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 449 (quoting Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985)).
145. Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441, 449 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. Vides-Vides v. I.N.S., 783 F.2d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986).
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standard. 147
The Ninth Circuit in Florez De Solis v. INS. 148 was faced with
the "would be" persecuted language being applied to an asylum
claim. 149 The court found this choice of words to be "unfortunate"
but not dispositive. 150 In Vides- Vides v. I.NS. 151 the court reasoned
that "the BIA's decision read as a whole, reflects its recognition,
although not necessarily adoption, of distinctive standards which
could be relevant" in distinguishing asylum from withholding of de-
portation. 152 While Vides-Vides provided insufficient evidence to es-
tablish a well-founded fear of persecution, the court's analysis
encourages the BIA to simply acknowledge, and not apply, separate
asylum and withholding of deportation standards. The result of this
encouragement was unmasked in Martinez-Sanchez v. 1N.S. .153
In Martinez-Sanchez, Judge Canby's majority opinion looked to
the evidence in the record and not the language employed by the
BIA. 154 The BIA had, the court concluded, applied a single standard
to both the asylum and withholding claims.155 The BIA attempted to
show two standards had been applied by stating that their "conclu-
sion is the same regardless of whether his claim is assessed in terms of
a 'clear probability,' 'good reason,' or 'realistic likelihood' standard of
persecution." 156 This attempt failed, however, because the BIA cited
three cases which held the two standards to be practically identical. 57
Because the BIA did not apply a less stringent standard to Martinez-
Sanchez's colorable asylum claim, the court reversed the administra-
tive decision. 158
147. Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d at 449.
148. Florez-De Solis v. I.N.S., 796 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1986).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1468.
152. Id.
153. Martinez-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).
154. Id. at 1398; see also Garcia-Ramos v. I.N.S., 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (the court
declined withholding of deportation but remanded the asylum claim because if the petitioner's
testimony was credible a well-founded fear had been established).
155. Martinez-Sanchez, 794 F.2d 1396.
156. Id. at 1399.
157. Id. at 1398 (quoting Matter of Martinez-Romero, 18 I & N Dec. 72 (BIA 1981),
aff'd, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982)) (citing Rejaie v. I.N.S., 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982));
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982); Matter of Martinez-Romero, 18 I & N Dec. 72
(BIA 1981) aff'd, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982).
158. Martinez-Sanchez, 794 F.2d at 1399 (the court remanded the case to the BIA to avoid
deciding the case de novo). Interestingly almost every case discussed in this section has con-
cerned Latin American aliens. This is no coincidence. A 1986 General Accounting Office
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IV. SUMMARY, THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW AND THE
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. An Overview of United States Refugee Law:
The Need for Reform
The United States' refugee policy between World War II and
1980 was formulated through a series of ad hoc and short term stat-
utes. Both the Displaced Persons Act' 59 and the Refugee Relief
Act 160 were of narrow numerical and geographic application. The
1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act contained a stringent and
discretionary withholding of deportation provision.1 6' The 1965
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 liberal-
ized admissions requirements, broadened geographic restrictions and
withdrew the physical persecution requirement from the withholding
of deportation provision. 1
62
The geographical and ideological restrictions of section 203(a)(7)
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, while less discriminatory
than previous provisions, were too narrow to meet the United States'
international obligations under the United Nations Protocol. 63 This
resulted in the government's continued and anomalous reliance on pa-
role. 164 The House and Senate reports preceding the Refugee Act's
enactment reveal an awareness of 203(a)(7)'s inadequacies. 165
The Refugee Act of 1980 set out a policy which is consistent with
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 66
The Refugee Act abolished the geographic and numerical restrictions
of section 203(a)(7), withholding of deportation became mandatory
(GAO) study concluded that while 66% of Iranian applicants were granted asylum only 2% of
Salvadoran applicants were successful. When torture, imprisonment and arrest were factors in
the asylum determination, the GAO study concluded that 4% of Salvadorans were granted
asylum as compared with 80% of Polish applicants. L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, Part I, at 4,
col. 3.
159. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (repealed 1952); see
supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
160. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (expired Dec. 31, 1956);
see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
161. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)); see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
162. Immigration and Nationality Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see supra notes 38-46 and ac-
companying text.
163. REFUGEE RESETrLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 8.
164. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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upon establishing the requisite elements, and a new separate asylum
provision was added to United States statutory law. 167 While the At-
torney General formerly used parole to bypass the restrictive immi-
gration structure,168 the Refugee Act now provides a legitimate
vehicle for regular refugee admittance which is not based on geo-
graphic regions. This brought United States statutory law into con-
formity with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. 169
The improvement in the statutory refugee law of the United
States is only valuable to the extent that the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, and the administrative and federal courts, imple-
ment the statutory goals. Different interpretations of the Refugee
Act's mandate, as discussed previously, have arisen. Within the
Ninth Circuit, the distinction between withholding of deportation and
asylum is unclear.
Two different lines of authority have emerged from the Ninth
Circuit's review of BIA decisions. The first line looks to the Refugee
Act itself to determine if the BIA is interpreting the law consistent
with the United Nations Protocol. The second line of authority
presumes BIA decisions are forthright and grants great deference to
BIA findings. The following chart summarizes the areas of greatest
divergence between the two lines of authority.
Topic Line One Line Two
I.
Asylum less than fifty percent chance of slightly less than the
(well-founded persecution required. 170  withholding burden of "more
fear) likely than not" required. 
17 1
167. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
169. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 19, 20 (1980).
170. Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985).
171. Rebollo-Jovel v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1986) (Canby, J., dissenting).
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Persecution is on account of
political opinion if the
persecutor thinks the alien
possesses a particular view.
172
The purpose of the Refugee Act
would be frustrated if a refugee
was forced to take sides.1
74
If an alien's testimony is credible
and unrefuted, corroborative
evidence is unnecessary to
establish an asylum or
withholding claim. 1
76
There would be an unreasonable




B. INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca
On March 9, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided
IN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca.8 0 The Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine the relationship between the standards for asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation.1 81 In holding the asylum and the withholding of
deportation standards to be different, the Court looked to "the plain
language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol,
and its legislative history .... 1,,82
172. Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985); see U.N. HANDBOOK,
supra note 49, para. 80-83 (selected portions reprinted in appendix).
173. Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1488, 1493, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes
130-133 and accompanying text.
174. Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984).
175. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1494.
176. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285; see U.N. HANDBOOK para. 196 at 47, supra
note 49.
177. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1492.
178. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
179. Diaz-Escobar, 782 F.2d at 1492.
180. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Id. At the time the Court heard the case only the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the government's contention that the two standards were identical.
182. Id. at 1222. The Court stated that even if an alien only had a 10% chance of persecu-
219
Persecution is on account of
political opinion if the individual
actually posseses such an
opinon. 1
7 3
The Refugee Act only protects
individuals if there is a
likelihood or fear of persecution
on account of their actual
"political opinion" or one of the




testimony is insufficient to
establish an asylum or
withholding claim. 1
7 7
If would approximate de novo
review to reverse the BIA when
the alien's evidence consists of
their own undocumented
testimony. 179
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1. The Plain Language of the Refugee Act
The plain language of the Refugee Act's withholding of deporta-
tion provision is "would be persecuted."'' 83 The words "would be"
impose objective criteria for withholding of deportation determina-
tions.'i 4 The term "well-founded fear" in the section 208(a) asylum
provision, on the other hand, requires an inquiry into the mental state
of the potential refugee.18 - Section 208(a)'s subjective component, is
also apparent from the plain language of the term "fear" in the stat-
ute: "[t]his ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be
lightly discounted."'' 86 In construing statutes, the Court presumed
that the legislature expressed their intent in the plain language of the
statute. 187
The Court found it significant that "Congress simultaneously
drafted section 208(a) and amended section 243(h)."' 88 This evi-
denced a conscious choice to create two distinct standards. Further
rejecting the government's statutory interpretation, the Court stated
that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which are con-
trary to clear congressional intent."'81 9  As the government's
construction of the statute was contrary to the statute's plain lan-
guage, the Court could have affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals on this ground alone.
2. The Refugee Act's Legislative History and Symmetry with the
United Nations Protocol
The Court noted that the legislative history of the Refugee Act
clearly indicated Congressional intent to conform United States law
with the United Nations Protocol. 90 The Refugee Act's definition of
tion he or she could be considered to possess a "well-founded fear" of persecution within the
United Nations' definition. See id. at 1217.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
184. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1212.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1213 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) and Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-199 (1976)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1221 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 & n.9 (1984)).
190. Id. "The Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to
which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to
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a "refugee," the standard by which asylum eligibility is measured, 191
is almost identical to that of the definition in the United Nations
Protocol. 92
Article 34 of the United Nations Protocol provides that "con-
tracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees. .... ,"193 This is the substantial equivalent of
section 208(a) because the "as far as possible" language gives signa-
tory countries discretionary freedom over refugee admittance. This
principle is embodied in section 208(a), which gives the Attorney
General discretion to determine refugee eligibility.194
As stated above, the Senate bill drafted the Act's asylum provi-
sion in mandatory terms.' 95 The actual Refugee Act followed the
House's discretionary version of section 208(a). 196 The Court inter-
preted Congressional adoption of the House version as expressing an
intent not to "restrict eligibility for asylum only to aliens meeting the
stricter standard."'' 97 The mandatory nature of withholding of depor-
tation perhaps explains why withholding, which offers only tempo-
rary relief, requires a higher burden than the discretionary asylum,
which affords greater protection.
If both standards were mandatory, the INS could have confused
them in such a way as to apply the more stringent "would be" stan-
dard to asylum determinations. This unfortunately occurred despite
statutory attempts to avoid having the stricter withholding standard
apply to asylum.
The Court was guided by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status when interpreting the meaning of the
term "refugee."'' 98 While the Court was cautious not to imply that
the Handbook was binding on the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, it found that "the Handbook provide[d] significant guidance
the obligations that the Protocol establishes." Id. at 1217 n.22 (citing McMullen v. I.N.S., 658
F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)).
191. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
192. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (1987); cf. supra notes 49 and 103
and accompanying text.
193. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
194. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
197. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219.
198. Id. at 1217 & n.22.
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in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform."', 99
3. Practical Result of the Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion clearly identified the
weakness in the majority opinion. 2°° The majority, while suggesting
alternative sources to interpret the mandate of section 208(a), did not
"attempt to give substance to the term 'well-founded fear' and leaves
that task to the 'process of case-by-case adjudication' by the INS
.... "201 Justice Blackmun wrote separately to emphasize the need to
follow the guidance of the circuit courts and legal scholars who have
grappled in earnest with interpreting the meaning of the well-founded
fear standard. This is especially necessary in light of the "purposeful
blindness [demonstrated] by the INS, which only now begins its task
of developing the standard entrusted to its care.
'202
As illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's experience, Congressional
failure to provide guidelines with which to interpret the Refugee Act
has caused the judiciary to send inconsistent messages to both the
administrative courts and the INS. Despite the fact that the Ninth
Circuit was applying two standards, there was a conspicuous lack of
consistency in their application. The two lines of authority are now
only guided by dicta as the Court's majority holding is limited to
merely stating that the two standards are different.
If I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca is to have any effect beyond overrul-
ing the Third Circuit's 20 3 application of one standard to both asylum
and withholding of deportation, the INS, BIA, and circuit courts
must apply the suggestions the Court offers in dicta. Although the
Court did not specify a particular well-founded fear interpretation,
the Court did suggest following the guidance of the circuit courts,
legal scholars who have extensively written on the topic, and the
United Nations' Handbook.2°4 The experience of the Ninth Circuit
demonstrates not only a high degree of refinement but also a great
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1222-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 1223.
202. Id.
203. At the time that .N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca was decided only the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals interpreted the withholding of deportation and asylum provisions to be the same.
Id. at 1215 & n.2.
204. The United Nations' Handbook provides a clause by clause analysis of the refugee
definition (selected portions reprinted in the Appendix). Unless there is some affirmative at-
tempt to follow the Court's dicta, the Ninth Circuit will be entirely unaffected by the holding
in this case. The sole victor will have been Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca.
222 [Vol. 10: 197
1988] Review of Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
deal of inconsistency. In order to see what role the federal courts will
play in refining the "well-founded fear" standard, it is useful to briefly
review the Court's past and present role in shaping administrative
decisions.
4. The Majority Opinion's Impact on the Scope of Judicial
Review over Administrative Decisions
The Court, by applying "traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion," may have extended the federal courts' power of review over
administrative decisions farther than it has existed in many years.205
Consequently, a brief survey of intrusive judicial review over agencies
is necessary.
a. The Non-delegation Doctrine Past and Present
The New Deal era saw the rise and extensive use of the adminis-
trative agency. 20 6 In response to constitutional problems with dele-
gated authority, the Court developed the non-delegation doctrine.
The doctrine prohibits Congressional delegations of power where the
legislature attempts to abdicate its duty to legislate.
Perhaps the most famous articulation of the doctrine was by Jus-
tice Hughes in his majority opinion in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States.20 7 Justice Hughes stated that "Congress is not permitted to
abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with
which it is ... vested. ' 20 8 One year after Schecter, the Court in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co. 209 struck down the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 on the grounds that it was not within Congress' Com-
merce Clause power.210 While Carter Coal was not a delegation case,
the Court relied on the principle articulated in Schecter that the fed-
eral government cannot act without a constitutional basis for the
power being exercised. 211
Profesor Gunther noted that the "Carter decision confirmed [the
Roosevelt administration's] . . . worst anticipations generated by
Schecter.' ' 212 Roosevelt responded by attempting to "pack" the
205. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1223-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2-13 to -14 (1984).
207. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
208. Id. at 529; see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
209. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. G. GUNTHER; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129 (1 lth ed. 1985).
223
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Supreme Court with extra Justices. While the plan did not succeed,
the Court abandoned its intrusive review over Congressional regula-
tions in the economic sphere.213 This caused President Roosevelt to
believe that he had ultimately prevailed in his conflict with the
Court.2
14
While the intrusive judicial review of Schecter and Carter Coal
has not been actively utilized since President Roosevelt's "Court-
packing" attempt, then Associate Justice Rehnquist has recently be-
gun a partial revival. In National Cable Television Association v.
United States,215 the Court reviewed a delegation of power by Con-
gress to the National Cable Television Association ("Association").21 6
The enabling legislation permitted the Association to be financially
independent from Congress by raising its own resources. 217 Congress
intended the Association to be able "to fully support all its activities
so the taxpayers [would] not be required to bear any part of the load
... 218 The issue resolved by the Court was whether this revenue-
generating function was a tax or a fee. 219 While the Constitution
grants Congress great latitude in the exercise of taxing power, only
Congress has the power to tax.220 If Congress vested the Association
with taxing power, it would have transferred an essential legislative
function in violation of the non-delegation principle.221 The Court
felt it necessary to point out the potential non-delegation problem.
However, because the Court concluded that the revenue was a fee,
there was no need to resolve the non-delegation issue. 222
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petrol Institute,223
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence stated that the non-delegation doc-
trine was not guilty of the judicial activism of the substantive due
process of the 1930's.224 The issue in Industrial Union was whether
Congress' delegation to the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
213. Id.
214. Id. at 128-30.
215. National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
216. Id. at 336.
217. Id. at 337.
218. Id. at 339 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-649, at 6).
219. National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 340-41.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 342.
223. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 675.
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tration of the power to determine what constitutes a "safe" benzene
level for the workplace was a standardless or permissible delegation.
Justice Rehnquist concluded it was sufficiently standardless to be pro-
hibited by the non-delegation doctrine because the legislature failed to
provide any information from which a meaningful standard could be
developed.
225
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in American Textile Man-
ufacturers. v. Donovan 226 reviewed the same benzene provision. The
dissent concluded that Congress had "unconstitutionally delegated to
the Executive Branch the authority to make the 'hard policy choices'
properly the task of the legislature.
'227
Justice Douglas' opinion in National Cable Television was quali-
tatively different than Justice Rehnquist's decisions in the above two
benzene cases. While the benzene cases dealt with a highly special-
ized area that required particular expertise in the field, National Cable
Television focused on the transfer of the fundamental Congressional
power to tax. Justice Rehnquist's application of the non-delegation
doctrine to the above type of delegation ignores the fact that this type
of broad delegation, especially in technical areas, has become com-
monplace in late-twentieth century American government. 228 More
importantly, Congress has neither the time nor expertise to specifi-
cally regulate in areas requiring special expertise.
Professor Davis, in his treatise on administrative law, suggests
that if the non-delegation doctrine is to have any application today it
will have to be modified. Professor Davis suggests following some
creative state court examples. 229 These state cases share a common
225. Id. at 611, 688.
226. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
227. Id. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist J., concurring).
228. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
229. K. DAVIs, supra note 206, § 3:1-2 (Supp. 1982); cf Comment, The Fourth Branch:
Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine, 4 B.Y.U. L. REV. 619 (1984). This comment proposes
the following analytical framework based on United States Supreme Court holdings and dicta,
for a modern revival of the non-delegation doctrine:
(1) A heavy presumption should exist in favor of popularly elected representatives
of the people making important policy decisions.
(2) The factors weighing against delegation of power must be balanced against the
need for and benefits to be gained by delegation.
(a) Factors weighing against delegation include:
(1) the subject matter has been constitutionally committed to Congress;
(2) the subject matter is resistant to the formulation of manageable gov-
erning standards;
(3) precise and meaningful standards are absent;
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principle: for a broad delegation to be tolerable there must be some
type of safeguard-judicial, procedural, or inherent in the language of
the statute.
230
The proposed modification of the non-delegation doctrine is ac-
tually a restatement of the corporate doctrine of ultra vires.231 This
results because broad delegations are to be tolerated if sufficient safe-
guards exist to prevent an agency from wielding power beyond that
which Congress has intended to delegate. In this manner judicial re-
view protects the Congressional intent behind a delegation of power.
Judicial review also protects continued Congressional confidence in
making broad delegations because the courts provide a mechanism to
check administrative abuse.
(4) existing standards are vague or general;
(5) the delegation involves constitutionally protected freedoms, or crimi-
nal sanctions;
(6) Congress has failed to make basic policy decisions before delegating or
the delegation does not reflect a policy decision that Congress has made;
and
(7) the policy decision to be made is relatively important.
(b) Factors weighing in favor of delegation include:
(1) there is an expressed need for delegation;
(2) delegation would achieve specific benefits;
(3) the issues are complex;
(4) the decision requires technological or industrial expertise;
(5) policy determinations are not necessary to the decision;
(6) the issues are related to foreign relations, trade, or commerce;
(7) the delegation involves merely ascertaining whether and when con-
duct falls within a previously established, well-defined statute; and
(8) the delegation involves only execution or enforcement responsibilities
pursuant to a previously established statute.
All of these factors are not necessarily entitled to equal weight but must be carefully
considered in light of the presumption against delegation and the facts and circum-
stances of each case that indicate a special need for delegation. A framework such as
the one proposed here may discourage irresponsible delegation of congressional au-
thority, promote more efficient legislative government, and ensure proper guidelines
when Congress does choose to delegate.
Id. at 640-41.
230. K. DAVIS, supra note 206, § 3:15; Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and
Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 698, 249 S.E.2d 402, 411 (1978) ("the presence or absence
of procedural safeguards is relevant to the broader question of whether a delegation of author-
ity is accompanied by adequate guiding standards."); State v. Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 77 Wis. 2d 126, 135, 252 N.W.2d 353, 357 (1977) ("broad grants of legisla-
tive power will be permitted where there are procedural and judicial safeguards .. "); Myer v.
Lord, 37 Or. App. 59, 65, 586 P.2d 367, 371 (1978) ("The existence of standards is relevant in
assessing the validity of delegation, but the existence of safeguards for those whose interest
may be affected is determinative." (emphasis in original)).
231. While "ultra vires" is a term that is properly used in the context of a corporation
acting beyond the scope of its corporate charter, the principle is the same: if there are suffi-
cient safeguards an administrative agency will not be able to exercise power beyond that which
Congress has delegated.
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In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 232 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress
could not only delegate policy-making authority, but agencies may
"properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise pol-
icy to inform its judgments. ' 233 The exercise of this policy-making
authority, however, is tempered by the legislative intent behind the
enabling statute. Thus, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Her-
rington,2 3 4 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, quoting the
United States Supreme Court, stated that "[w]hen an agency does not
reasonably accommodate the policies of a statute or reaches a decision
that is 'not one that Congress would have sanctioned' a reviewing
court must intervene to enforce the policy decisions made by Con-
gress. '235 The Court in LN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca noted that:
[i]f one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new defini-
tion of "refugee," and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of
Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees .... 236
The above quote from Herrington construes the broad powers of
an administrative agency articulated in Chevron, US.A, and tempered
by the restrictions stated in United States v. Shimer.237 In Shimer, the
Court implied that a reviewing court has the power to overrule ad-
ministrative decisions contrary to a statute or its legislative history.
Further, if an administrative agencys interpretation of the statute "is
not one that Congress would have sanctioned," then a reviewing court
may enforce the legislature's policy choice.238 Justice Stevens also uti-
lized Shimer and Chevron US.A to support the Court's holding.
239
Because the government's interpretation of the well-founded fear
standard was contrary to Congressional intent to conform United
States law to the Protocol, it was declared invalid.
24
0
232. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
233. Id. at 865.
234. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
235. Id. at 1383 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (emphasis
added)).
236. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (citing the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
606 U.N.T.S. 267).
237. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
238. Id. at 382-83.
239. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1220-21 nn.29-30.
240. Id.
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This position is consistent with Professor Davis' notion of a mod-
ified non-delegation doctrine.241 If reviewing courts are given the flex-
ibility to intervene in administrative decisions that are contrary to
Congressional intent, agencies will be forced to be more responsible in
their statutory construction. Prior to L N. S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca it was
unclear whether a reviewing court could take this position. The im-
pact of the majority opinion on administrative law will be profound.
Courts are now armed with the tools to look beyond the language of a
statute and look to the legislative intent in construing an administra-
tive agency's mandate. The unanswered question is: will this usher in
a new era of judicial activism or constructively cut back on the previ-
ously unchecked administrative abuses that occur in some agencies?
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
Because the United States Supreme Court, in INS. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, held that Congress clearly intended to conform United
States refugee law to the United Nations Protocol, it would violate
Congressional policy for the BIA to apply a standard inconsistent
with the Protocol. Additionally, a reviewing court can only deter-
mine if the BIA is acting within the scope of its delegated authority by
examining whether the BIA is acting consistently with the United Na-
tions Protocol.
It is important to remember that the previous discussion of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's review of withholding of deportation
and asylum assumed that the two standards were different. Despite
this difference, two lines of authority arose: one giving presumptive
effect to BIA decisions and the other looking to the United Nations
Protocol for guidance. Unless the United States Supreme Court's reli-
ance on United States v. Shimer obligates courts to enforce BIA com-
formity with the Protocol, the 1N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca decision will
have only a de minimis impact. 24
2
An additional problem is determining what the United Nations
Protocol actually mandates. In 1979, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees published its Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
243
241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
242. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, was the only circuit to apply the two
standards the same even after .N.S. v. Stevic.
243. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 49 (selected portions reprinted in the Appendix).
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In light of the need to apply the Refugee Act consistently with the
Protocol, the United Nations' Handbook is invaluable. The Hand-
book contains a provision-by-provision analysis of each clause in the
"refugee" definition. 244
By officially adopting the Handbook, Congress could take a sig-
nificant move towards insuring that its intent behind the Refugee Act
is implemented. This would provide greater consistency in interpret-
ing the Protocol and form a concrete basis for implementing the Refu-
gee Act's stated purpose: "to provide comprehensive and uniform
provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of... refugees
"245
If Congress fails to adopt the Handbook, the judiciary will still be
in a position to review BIA decisions consistent with a modified non-
delegation doctrine. By refusing to give presumptive effect to BIA
decisions, the courts can provide the necessary safeguard to prevent
the BIA from acting in a manner that Congress would not approve.
There is an extreme danger, however, in leaving the future imple-
mentation of the Refugee Act exclusively to the administrative branch
and the federal courts. Difficulty in interpreting the Refugee Act has
been an ongoing problem since the Act's conception. There is noth-
ing to suggest that the Supreme Court's LN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca de-
cision will bring uniformity in construing the definition of "refugee."
Quite to the contrary, the opinion gives little guidance and opens the
door wide to a new era of judicial "legislation."9
Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently dis-
tinguished between asylum and withholding of deportation cases in its
review of BIA decisions, the LN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca decision will
have no effect on the continued divergence between the various case
lines discussed above. Therefore, it is essential that the United Na-
tions' Handbook be officially adopted to insure that Congressional in-
tent is implemented and the United States, as a signatory to the
Protocol, meets its obligations under international law.
Richard R. Silver*
244. Id.
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1982).
* The author is indebted to Associate Professor Edith Friedler and Lynne Bigley for
their thoughtful comments'and support on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Kei Nagami for
providing the equilibrium and loving support that is essential to a productive work environ-
ment and a constructive home life.
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APPENDIX*
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES Handbook On Procedures And Criteria For De-
termining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
Geneva, September 1979
CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
28. A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Conven-
tion as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This
would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is
formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not
therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not
become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he
is a refugee.
29. Determination of refugee status is a process which takes place in
two stages. Firstly, it is necessary to ascertain the relevant facts of the
case. Secondly, the definitions in the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol have to be applied to the facts thus ascertained.
30. The provisions of the 1951 Convention defining who is a refugee
consist of three parts, which have been termed respectively "inclu-
sion", "cessation" and "exclusion" clauses.
31. The inclusion clauses define the criteria that a person must sat-
isfy in order to be a refugee. They form the positive basis upon which
the determination of refugee status is made. The so-called cessation
and exclusion clauses have a negative significance; the former indicate
the conditions under which a refugee ceases to be refugee and the
latter enumerate the circumstances in which a person is excluded
from the application of the 1951 Convention although meeting the
positive criteria of the inclusion clauses.
* Reprinted with permission of the United Nations Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
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32. Article 1 A(1) of the 1951 Convention deals with statutory refu-
gees, i.e. persons considered to be refugees under the provisions of
international instruments preceding the Convention. This provision
states that:
"For the purposes of the present Convention, the term refugee'
shall apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12
May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 Octo-
ber 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939
or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Or-
ganization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the
status of refugees being accorded to persons who fulfil the condi-
tions of paragraph 2 of this section."
33. The above enumeration is given in order to provide a link with
the past and to ensure the continuity of international protection of
refugees who became the concern of the international community at
various earlier period. As already indicated (para. 4 above), these in-
struments have by now lost much of their significance, and a discus-
sion of them here would be of little practical value. However, a
person who has been considered a refugee under the terms of any of
these instruments is automatically a refugee under the 1951 Conven-
tion. Thus, a holder of a so-called "Nansen Passport" or a "Certifi-
cate of Eligibility" issued by the International Refugee Organization
must be considered a refugee under the 1951 Convention unless one of
the cessation clauses has become applicable to his case or he is ex-
cluded from the application of the Convention by one of the exclusion
clauses. This also applies to a surviving child of a statutory refugee.
(2) General Definition in the 1951 Convention
34. According to Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Convention the term
"refugee" shall apply to any person who:
As a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
This general definition is discussed in detail below.
B. Interpretation of terms
(2) "well founded fear of being persecuted"
(a) General analysis
37. The phrase "well-founded fear of being persecuted" is the key
phrase of the definition. It reflects the views of its authors as to the
main elements of refugee character. It replaces the earlier method of
defining refugees by categories (i.e. persons of a certain origin not en-
joying the protection of their country) by the general concept of
"fear" for a relevant motive. Since fear is subjective, the definition
involves a subjective element in the person applying for recognition as
a refugee. Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily
require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judg-
ment on the situation prevailing in his country of origin.
38. To the element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective condi-
tion-is added the qualification "well-founded". This implies that it
is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines
his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by
an objective situation. The term "well-founded fear" therefore con-
tains a subjective and an objective element, and in determining
whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken into
consideration.
39. It may be assumed that, unless he seeks adventure or just wishes
to see the world, a person would not normally abandon his home and
country without some compelling reason. There may be many rea-
sons that are compelling and understandable, but only one motive has
been singled out to denote a refugee. The expression "owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted"-for the reasons stated-by indi-
cating a specific motive automatically makes all other reasons for es-
cape irrelevant to the definition. It rules out such persons as victims
of famine or natural disaster, unless they also have well-founded fear
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of persecution for one of the reasons stated. Such other motives may
not, however, be altogether irrelevant to the process of determining
refugee status, since all the circumstances need to be taken into ac-
count for a proper understanding of the applicant's case.
40. An evaluation of the subjective element is inseparable from an
assessment of the personality of the applicant, since psychological re-
actions of different individuals may not be the same in identical condi-
tions. One person may have strong political or religious convictions,
the disregard of which would make his life intolerable; another may
have no such strong convictions. One person may make an impulsive
decision to escape; another may carefully plan his departure.
41. Due to the importance that the definition attaches to the subjec-
tive element, an assessment of credibility is indispensable where the
case is not sufficiently clear from the facts on record. It will be neces-
sary to take into account the personal and family background of the
applicant, his membership of a particular racial, religious, national,
social or political group, his own interpretation of his situation, and
his personal experiences- in other words, everything that may serve
to indicate that the predominant motive for his application is fear.
Fear must be reasonable. Exaggerated fear, however, may be well-
founded if, in all the circumstances of the case, such a state of mind
can be regarded as justified.
42. As regards the objective element, it is necessary to evaluate the
statements made by the applicant. The competent authorities that are
called upon to determine refugee status are not required to pass judg-
ment on conditions in the applicant's country of origin. The appli-
cant's statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and
must be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation.
A knowledge of conditions in the applicant's country of origin-
while not a primary objective-is an important element in assessing
the applicant's credibility. In general, the applicant's fear should be
considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree,
that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable
to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same
reasons be intolerable if he returned there.
43. These considerations need not necessarily be based on the appli-
cant's own personal experience. What, for example, happened to his
friends and relatives and other members of the same racial or social
group may well show that his fear that sooner or later he also will
become a victim of persecution is well-founded. The laws of the coun-
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try of origin, and particularly the manner in which they are applied,
will be relevant. The situation of each person must, however, be as-
sessed on its own merits. In the case of a well-known personality, the
possibility of persecution may be greater than in the case of a person
in obscurity. All these factors, e.g. a person's character, his back-
ground, his influence, his wealth or his outspokenness, may lead to
the conclusion that his fear of persecution is "well-founded".
44. While refugee status must normally be determined on an indi-
vidual basis, situations have also arisen in which entire groups have
been displaced under circumstances indicating that members of the
group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situations
the need to provide assistance is often extremely urgent and it may
not be possible for purely practical reasons to carry out an individual
determination of refugee status for each member of the group. Re-
course has therefore been had to so-called "group determination" of
refugee status, whereby each member of the group is regarded prima
facie (i.e. in the absence of evidence to the contrary) as a refugee.
45. Apart from the situations of the type referred to in the preceding
paragraph, an applicant for refugee status must normally show good
reason why he individually fears persecution. It may be assumed that
a person has well-founded fear of being persecuted if he has already
been the victim of persecution for one of the reasons enumerated in
the 1951 Convention. However, the word "fear" refers not only to
persons who have actually been persecuted, but also to those who
wish to avoid a situation entailing the risk of persecution.
46. The expressions "fear of persecution" or even "persecution" are
usually foreign to a refugee's normal vocabulary. A refugee will in-
deed only rarely invoke "fear of persecution" in these terms, though it
will often be implicit in his story. Again, while a refugee may have
very definite opinions for which he has had to suffer, he may not, for
psychological reasons, be able to describe his experiences and situa-
tion in political terms.
47. A typical test of the well-foundedness of fear will arise when an
applicant is in possession of a valid national passport. It has some-
times been claimed that possession of a passport signifies that the issu-
ing authorities do not intend to persecute the holder, for otherwise
they would not have issued a passport to him. Though this may be
true in some cases, many persons have used a legal exit from their
country as the only means of escape without ever having revealed
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their political opinions, knowledge of which might place them in a
dangerous situation vis-a-vis the authorities.
48. Possession of a passport cannot therefore always be considered
as evidence of loyalty on the part of the holder, or as an indication of
the absence of fear. A passport may even be issued to a person who is
undesired in his country of origin, with the sole purpose of securing
his departure, and there may also be cases where a passport has been
obtained surreptitiously. In conclusion, therefore, the mere posses-
sion of a valid national passport is no bar to refugee status.
49. If, on the other hand, an applicant, without good reason, insists
on retaining a valid passport of a country of whose protection he is
allegedly unwilling to avail himself, this may cast doubt on the valid-
ity of his claim to have "well-founded fear". Once recognized, a refu-
gee should not normally retain his national passport.
50. There may, however, be exceptional situations in which a person
fulfilling the criteria of refugee status may retain his national pass-
port- or be issued with a new one by the authorities of his countries
of origin under special arrangements. Particularly where such ar-
rangements do not imply that the holder of the national passport is
free to return to his country without prior permission, they may not
be incompatible with refugee status.
(b) Persecution
51. There is no universally accepted definition of "persecution", and
various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little
success. From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred
that a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, national-
ity, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is
always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights-for the
same reasons-would also constitute persecution.
52. Whether other prejudicial actions or threats would amount to
persecution will depend on the circumstances of each case, including
the subjective element to which reference has been made in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. The subjective character of fear of persecution re-
quires an evaluation of the opinions and feelings of the person
concerned. It is also in the light of such opinions and feelings that
any actual or anticipated measures against him must necessarily be
viewed. Due to variations in the psychological make-up of individuals
and in the circumstances of each case, interpretations of what
amounts to persecution are bound to vary.
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53. In addition, an applicant may have been subjected to various
measures not in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimina-
tion in different forms), in some cases combined with other adverse
factor (e.g. general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin).
In such situations, the various elements involved may, if taken to-
gether, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reason-
ably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on
"cumulative grounds". Needless to say, it is not possible to lay down
a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can give rise to a valid
claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend on all the cir-
cumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and eth-
nological context.
(3) "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion"
(a) General analysis
66. In order to be considered a refugee, a person must show well-
founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated above. It is
immaterial whether the persecution arises from any single one of
these reasons or from a combination of two or more of them. Often
the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecu-
tion feared. It is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an
extent as to identify the reasons in detail.
67. It is for the examiner, when investigating the facts of the case, to
ascertain the reason or reasons for the persecution feared and to de-
cide whether the definition in the 1951 Convention is met with in this
respect. It is evident that the reasons for persecution under these vari-
ous headings will frequently overlap. Usually there will be more than
one element combined in one person, e.g. a political opponent who
belongs to a religious or national group, or both, and the combination
of such reasons in his person may be relevant in evaluating his well-
founded fear.
(b) Race
68. Race, in the present connexion, has to be understood in its wid-
est sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as
"6races" in common usage. Frequently it will also entail membership
of a specific social group of common descent forming a minority
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within a larger population. Discrimination for reasons of race has
found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations
of human rights. Racial discrimination, therefore, represents an im-
portant element in determining the existence of persecution.
69. Discrimination on racial grounds will frequently amount to per-
secution in the sense of the 1951 Convention. This will be the case if,
as a result of racial discrimination, a person's human dignity is af-
fected to such an extent as to be incompatible with the most elemen-
tary and inalienable human rights, or where the disregard of racial
barriers is subject to serious consequences.
70. The mere fact of belonging to a certain racial group will nor-
mally not be enough to substantiate a claim of refugee status. There
may, however, be situations where, due to particular circumstances
affecting the group, such membership will in itself be sufficient ground
to fear persecution.
(c) Religion
71. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human
Rights Covenant proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, which right includes the freedom of a person to change
his religion and his freedom to manifest it in public or private, in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
72. Persecution for "reasons of religion" may assume various forms,
e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship
in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious measures of
discrimination imposed on persons because they practice their reli-
gion or belong to a particular religious community.
73. Mere membership of a particular religious community will nor-
mally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There
may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can
be a sufficient ground.
(d) Nationality
74. The term "nationality" in this context is not to be understood
only as "citizenship". It refers also to membership of an ethnic or
linguistic group and may occasionally overlap with the term "race".
Persecution for reasons of nationality may consist of adverse attitudes
and measures directed against a national (ethnic, linguistic) minority
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and in certain circumstances the fact of belonging to such a minority
may in itself give rise to well founded fear of persecution.
75. The co-existence within the boundaries of a State of two or more
national (ethnic, linguistic) groups may create situations of conflict
and also situations of persecution or danger of persecution. It may
not always be easy to distinguish between persecution for reasons of
nationality and persecution for reasons of political opinion when a
conflict between national groups is combined with political move-
ments, particularly where a political movement is identified with a
specific "nationality".
76. Whereas in most cases persecution for reasons of nationality is
feared by persons belonging to a national minority, there have been
many cases in various continents where a person belonging to a ma-
jority group may fear persecution by a dominant minority.
(e) Membership of a particular social group
77. A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of simi-
lar background, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution
under this heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear perse-
cution on other grounds, i.e. race, religion or nationality.
78. Membership of such a particular social group may be at the root
of persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to
the Government or because the political outlook, antecedents or eco-
nomic activity of its members, or the very existence of the social
group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government's policies.
79. Mere membership of a particular social group will not normally
be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, how-
ever, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a suffi-
cient ground to fear persecution.
(f) Political opinion
80. Holding political opinions different from those of the Govern-
ment is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an appli-
cant must show that he has a fear of persecution for holding such
opinions. This presupposes that the applicant holds opinions not tol-
erated by the authorities, which are critical of their policies or meth-
ods. It also presupposes that such opinions have come to the notice of
the authorities or are attributed by them to the applicant. The polit-
ical opinions of a teacher or writer may be more manifest than those
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of a person in a less exposed position. The relative importance or
tenacity of the applicant's opinions-in so far as this can be estab-
lished from all the circumstances of the case-will also be relevant.
81. While the definition speaks of persecution "for reasons of polit-
ical opinion" it may not always be possible to establish a causal link
between the opinion expressed and the related measures suffered or
feared by the applicant. Such measures have only rarely been based
expressly on "opinion". More frequently, such measures take the
form of sanctions for alleged criminal acts against the ruling power.
It will, therefore, be necessary to establish the applicant's political
opinion, which is at the root of his behaviour, and the fact that it has
led or may lead to the persecution that he claims to fear.
82. As indicated above, persecution "for reasons of political opin-
ion" implies that an applicant holds an opinion that either has been
expressed or has come to the attention of the authorities. There may,
however, also be situations in which the applicant has not given any
expression to his opinions. Due to the strength of his convictions,
however, it may be reasonable to assume that his opinions will sooner
or later find expression and that the applicant will, as a result, come
into conflict with the authorities. Where this can reasonably be as-
sumed, the applicant can be considered to have fear of persecution for
reasons of political opinion.
83. An applicant claiming fear of persecution because of political
opinion need not show that the authorities of his country of origin
knew of his opinions before he left the country. He may have con-
cealed his political opinion and never have suffered any discrimination
or persecution. However, the mere fact of refusing to avail himself of
the protection of his Government, or a refusal to return, may disclose
the applicant's true state of mind and give rise to fear of persecution.
In such circumstances the test of well-founded fear would be based on
an assessment of the consequences that an applicant having certain
political dispositions would have to face if he returned. This applies
particularly to the so-called refugee "sur place." (footnote omitted)
84. Where a person is subject to prosecution or punishment for a
political offence, a distinction may have to be drawn according to
whether the prosecution is for political opinion or for politically-moti-
vated acts. If the prosecution pertains to a punishable act committed
out of political motives, and if the anticipated punishment is in con-
formity with the general law of the country concerned, fear of such
prosecution will not in itself make the applicant a refugee.
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85. Whether a political offender can also be considered a refugee
will depend upon various other factors. Prosecution for an offence
may, depending upon the circumstances, be a pretext for punishing
the offender for his political opinions or the expression thereof.
Again, there may be reason to believe that a political offender would
be exposed to excessive or arbitrary punishment for the alleged of-
fence. Such excessive or arbitrary punishment will amount to
persecution.
86. In determining whether a political offender can be considered a
refugee, regard should also be had to the following elements: person-
ality of the applicant, his political opinion, the motive behind the act,
the nature of the act committed, the nature of the prosecution and its
motives; finally, also, the nature of the law on which the prosecution
is based. These elements may go to show that the person concerned
has a fear of persecution and not merely a fear of prosecution and
punishment-within the law-for an act committed by him.
